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Friendship might seem like a bizarre virtue—or not a virtue at all. In
Aristotle’s early discussion of the virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics, we
see courage, temperance, generosity, magnificence, magnanimity, pride,
wit, and justice. These would all seem to be, in the first instance and
primarily, monadic properties of individual agents. To be courageous is
to be disposed to think, feel, desire, deliberate, act, and react in charac-
teristic ways. Even if no one else is courageous, it would still be
possible—though extremely difficult—for you to be courageous. Of
course, if there are no threats to be opposed, you may never have a chance
to manifest or express your courage. Furthermore, it would surely be
easier to develop courage in the company of others who either are or strive
to be courageous. And it may also be easier to develop or sustain courage
when others think of you as courageous and signal those thoughts to you.
But, onemight think, even if none of these enabling facts obtains, it would
still be possible, conceptually speaking, to be courageous.
Or consider generosity. To be generous is to be disposed to think, feel,
desire, deliberate, act, and react in characteristic ways. Even if no one else
is generous, it would still be possible—though extremely difficult—for
you to be generous. Of course, if there were no other people who needed
or wanted or would appreciate what you have, or if you were so down on
your luck that you had no resources to offer, you may never have a
chance to manifest or express your generosity. Furthermore, it would
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surely be easier to develop generosity in the company of others who are
or strive to be generous (and, for that matter, grateful). And it may also
be easier to develop or sustain generosity when others think of you as
generous and signal those thoughts to you. But, one might think, even if
none of these enabling facts obtains, it would still be possible, conceptu-
ally speaking, to be generous.
Friendship appears to be different. It seems to be, in the first instance
and primarily, a dyadic relation between two people. To be a friend is to
be disposed to think, feel, desire, deliberate, act, and react in characteristic
ways towards a particular person, who is likewise disposed to think, feel,
desire, deliberate, act, and react in those same characteristic ways towards
you. If no one else is a friend, then it is conceptually impossible—not just
difficult—for you to be a friend as well (NE VIII:2, 1155a; see Cooper
1977b, 624 and Nehamas 2010, 216). It is not just easier to develop
friendship in the company of others who are doing so as well; it is in fact
impossible to become a friend without there being someone else who also
becomes a friend, namely your friend.
In this paper, I describe some of what I take to be the more interesting
features of friendship, then explore the extent to which other virtues can
be reconstructed as sharing those features. I use trustworthiness as my
example throughout, but I think that other virtues such as generosity and
gratitude, pride and respect, and the producer’s and consumer’s sense of
humor can also be analyzed with this model. The aim of the paper is not
to demonstrate that all moral virtues are exactly like friendship in all
important respects, but rather to articulate a fruitful model in which to
explore the virtues. Section 8.2 explores the relational nature of friend-
ship, drawing on Aristotle’s discussion of friendship in the Nicomachean
Ethics. Section 8.3 catalogues four motivations for taking seriously the
friendship model of virtue. Section 8.4 applies the friendship model in
depth to the virtue of trustworthiness.
8.2 The Relational Nature of Friendship
Being a friend isn’t just a matter of your first-order cognitive, affective,
evaluative, and behavioral dispositions; to be a friend means, among
other things, to have particular de re attitudes towards another person
(your friend), and for that person to have congruent de re attitudes
towards you (NE VIII:2, 1156a). That is, for you to be my friend, you
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need to think of me as your friend, to wish me well for my own sake, to
wish me well in virtue of my good character (or, in other types of
friendship, in virtue of my contributing to your utility or pleasure), and
so on. Likewise, I need to think of you as my friend, to wish you well for
your own sake, to wish you well in virtue of your good character (or in
virtue of your contributing to my utility or pleasure), and so on.
But that is not enough. Not only must both you and I have these
attitudes, but the existence of these attitudes must be mutual know-
ledge between us (NE IX:5, 1166b). If I wish you well for your own
sake and in virtue of your good character, and you wish me well for
my own sake and in virtue of my good character, but neither of us
knows how the other feels, we are not friends. Instead, we merely
harbor mutual but unrecognized good will towards one another. To be
your friend, I need to know that you wish me well for my own sake
and in virtue of my good character, and you need to know that
I wish you well for your own sake and in virtue of your good character
(NE VIII:3, 1156b).
In fact, even that is not enough. We could satisfy this description and
yet still not be friends. If we have these attitudes towards each other, and
each finds out through reliable testimony that the other does as well, it
would still seem strange to say that we are friends. We might never have
met each other, yet satisfy these conditions. Friends have a more intimate
connection than this. I also need to know that you know that I wish you
well for your own sake and in virtue of your good character, and you
need to know that I know that you wish me well for my own sake and in
virtue of my good character.
It’s arguable that even this is not enough, and that what needs to hold
is that we share common knowledge of our attitudes: I know that you
wish me well for my own sake and in virtue of my good character; and
you know that I know that you wish me well for my own sake and in
virtue of my good character; and you know that I know that you know
that I know that you wish me well for my own sake and in virtue of my
good character, and so on. Or, somewhat less strongly, perhaps what’s
required is that there be what Lewis (2002, 56) calls a basis for common
knowledge between us, even if only two levels of mutual knowledge are
actually present. I will not press this point here, for even if all that’s
required is two orders of mutual knowledge (I know that you know, and
you know that I know), my point still holds that friendship is an
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interesting virtue because it requires reciprocated de re attitudes and
some kind of mutual recognition of the existence of this reciprocation.
Finally, friends typically harbor other, more complicated, attitudes
towards one another, and react with higher-order attitudes to the pres-
ence or absence of lower-order attitudes. Roberts (2013) argues that de re
emotional interactions are constitutive of friendship (p. 141); he explores
the ways in which emotions and emotional feedback loops strengthen
and desiccate such relationships as friendship, enmity, civility, and
incivility. For example, consider a sister who generously and in a spirit
of friendship gives her brother her own ticket to a concert that he would
like to attend. He feels the emotion of gratitude for this gift, which he
expresses with a token of thanks. Satisfied that her generosity has hit its
mark, she is “gratified by his gratitude . . .And he may in turn be gratified
that she is gratified by his gratitude” (p. 137). Despite the fact that this is
a tiny schematic example, it plausibly contains a fourth-order emotion
(he is gratified that she is gratified that he is gratified that she was
generous). Such episodes are, in Roberts’s view, constitutive of friendship
and other normative personal relationships (pp. 140–1). Constructive
feedback loops strengthen positive personal relationships but aggravate
negative relationships such as enmity (leading enemies to hate, despise,
or contemn each other all the more); destructive feedback loops, by
contrast, undermine positive relationships (introducing distrust, con-
tempt, or other negative emotions into extant friendships) but ameliorate
negative relationships (introducing sympathy, respect, or even admir-
ation into extant enmities).
In sum, being a friend is not just causally but constitutively dependent
on there being another person who has the same virtue. It is, second, not
just causally but constitutively dependent on there being another person
towards whom you harbor certain de re attitudes, and who reciprocates
them. Third, it is not just casually but constitutively dependent on your
thinking of yourself as someone’s friend. Fourth, it is also not just causally
but constitutively dependent on there being between you and your friend
at least two orders of mutual knowledge of these attitudes. Fifth, it is not
just causally but constitutively dependent on you and your friend having
first-, second-, and perhaps even third- and fourth-order emotions that
include the other person in their content. Finally, it is not just causally but
constitutively dependent on you and your friend sometimes knowing (and
perhaps knowing that you know) that you are engaging in joint planning.
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One might worry that these arguments press too hard on the relational
aspects of friendship. Surely, one might think, I can be a friendly person
even if everyone else is an asshole and either snubs or betrays my
attempts at friendship. There is an important sense in which, even in
such an unlucky social environment, I can still be a friendly person. This
is a fair point, and one which should lead us to distinguish between the
disposition or trait of friendliness or agreeableness or gregariousness,
which is arguably a monadic property of an individual, and the virtue of
friendship, which clearly is not. One test that seems to do a good job of
drawing this distinction is to ask whether the person in question is
friendly or a friend. There is a double dissociation between these. Some-
one might be friendly but still not have any friends. Conversely, it’s
possible for someone to be dispositionally grumpy or unagreeable but
nevertheless to be a friend, provided one’s grumpiness or unagreeable-
ness doesn’t become so pronounced that it turns into outright misan-
thropy and make one unsuitable to be anyone’s friend. A modicum of
grouchiness can even be charming.1
8.3 Motivating the Friendship Model
In this paper, I explore the prospects for using the features of friendship
identified above as a model for trust. This exploration is motivated on
four independent grounds, which I discuss below.
8.3.1 The historical motive
Of the ten books of the Nicomachean Ethics, fully two are devoted to
discussing friendship.2 This is twice as much attention as justice receives,
and as much as all of the other moral virtues combined. Yet contempor-
ary neo-Aristotelian treatments of virtue rarely address friendship, and
give it short shrift when they do. Annas (1993, 249–60) devotes twelve of
the five hundred plus pages of her book to friendship, and mentions it
1 For an example, consider the case of a husband whose wife goes on anti-depressants to
help her cope with her mother’s recent death. The anti-depressants work too well, and she
flips from being amusingly sarcastic to overbearingly cheerful. It can happen! (<http://www.
slate.com/articles/life/dear_prudence/2013/04/dear_prudence_my_wife_s_personality_has_
changed_since_going_on_paxil.html>)
2 I should note that, though I draw here on what I take to be Aristotle’s conception of
friendship, I am not offering an interpretation of Aristotle.
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only twice in her book (2011, 76, 151). Geach (1977, 80) mentions it
once. Hurka (2001, 35–6, 200) mentions it in only a couple of passages.
Hursthouse (1999, 11) calls friendship an “awkward exception” because
it is relational. MacIntyre (1981, 123, 156–8) mentions friendship only
twice. Russell (2009) barely engages friendship in his massive tome. Slote
(2001) only mentions friendship in the context of broader discussions of
love, community, and achievement. Snow (2008), despite the fact that
her book is titled Virtue as Social Intelligence, never once uses the word
‘friendship.’ Adams (2006, 25–7, 69–92) and Roberts (2013, ch. 7) are the
exceptions that make the rule.
The main topic of discussion in the contemporary literature on
friendship is the extent to which various moral theories induce ‘moral
schizophrenia’ by calling on us to be motivated by abstract principles—
such as maximizing good outcomes or acting from duty—that seem
incompatible with the warmth and intimacy of friendship (Stocker
1976). While this is an interesting issue, it is only tangentially related
to the central questions of friendship:What does it mean to be a friend? Is
friendship a virtue? How is friendship related to trust, hope, and other
attitudes? How is friendship related to more commonly discussed virtues,
such as trustworthiness, generosity, and pride? It would be surprising if
this bias in the scholarship did not distort our understanding of virtue.
8.3.2 The moral psychological motive
If there is a consensus in moral psychology, it’s that virtue-concepts are
‘thick,’ in the sense that they refer to properties that are at once descrip-
tive (and explanatory) and evaluative. To call someone a liar is to make
an assertion about what sorts of behavior that person tends to engage in,
but also to evaluate his behavior or behavioral tendencies by a normative
standard. To think of someone as temperate is to attribute some behav-
iors or behavioral tendencies to her, but also to evaluate her behavior or
behavioral tendencies by a normative standard. If you find out that
someone about whom you have an otherwise good opinion tends to lie,
you will feel considerable pressure to revise your good opinion or to find
some excuses for his lying. If you find out that someone you would
otherwise consider temperate has repeatedly ended up vomiting wine
into a gutter, you will feel considerable pressure to revise your good
opinion or to find some excuse for her excesses.
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Friendships seem to have the same thick character as virtues. If you are
my friend, I (and, for that matter, third parties) can form well-founded
descriptive expectations about how you will behave, what you will think
and feel, and how you will deliberate. If I am your friend, you (and, for
that matter, third parties) can explain some of my behaviors, thoughts,
feelings, and deliberative processes. In addition, if you are my friend,
I (and third parties) will tend to engage in characteristic evaluations. For
instance, I will tend to give you the benefit of the evaluative doubt, and
will—when I cannot find a way to do so—feel some pressure either to cut
off our friendship or at least to scale it back. Moreover, realizing that you
have inadvertently befriended a despicable person naturally engenders
self-doubt: what sort of person am I, that I could befriend someone like
this? What sort of person do I appear to be, that someone like this would
want me for a friend? Additionally, those who think of you as a good
person will, when they find that I am your friend, tend to form positive
evaluations of me (if I am a stranger to them), or either positively revise
their opinion of me (if they think well enough of you) or negatively revise
their opinion of you (if they think ill enough of me).
In addition, it’s generally recognized that virtues are threshold con-
cepts: you can be honest enough to count as an honest person even if
you’ve lied or cheated or stolen once in your life. You can be generous
enough to count as a generous person even if in many (probably even
most) cases in which you’ve had the opportunity to give something to
someone who would enjoy or appreciate it, you did nothing. Honesty
and generosity come in degrees. To count as honest or generous full stop,
one needn’t be at the furthest end of the spectrum: one simply needs to
embody enough of the trait in question. Friendship also has this charac-
teristic. I can be your friend even if we’re not BFFs. Friendship comes in
degrees. I can be better friends with X than with Y even though I’m
friends with both X and Y. If, however, the quality of my relationship
with X suffers too much, we cease to be friends at all. Where exactly to
draw these lines is tricky business that I won’t try to spell out in detail in
this paper, but then, where exactly to draw the line between generosity
and non-generosity is probably just as difficult.
Friendships thus seem to share with virtues both evaluative thickness
and threshold instantiation properties; this is evidence that they belong
in the same category. Exploring the features of one may illuminate the
features of the other.
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8.3.3 The empirical motive
As I have argued elsewhere (Alfano 2013, 2014), there are empirical
grounds for doubting whether virtue as conceived in currently dominant
neo-Aristotelian theories is an achievable ideal. John Doris (1998, 2002),
Gilbert Harman (1999), and I (2013) have argued that most people’s
conduct does not seem to be structured by robust, global dispositions
such as honesty—at least when they are tested in a decontextualized
laboratory setting. Seemingly trivial and normatively irrelevant situ-
ational influences, such as mood modulators and ambient sensory
stimuli, predict and explain people’s cognitive, affective, evaluative, and
behavioral responses as well as—and sometimes better than—personality
variables. This is not the place to delve deeply into the dialectic between
philosophical situationists and defenders of neo-Aristotelian ethics.
Instead, I merely want to point out that there is suggestive empirical
evidence—much of which I canvass in my (2013) book—for the
phenomenon of factitious virtue. A factitious virtue simulates its
neo-Aristotelian counterpart through the stabilizing influences of self-
concept and social expectation-signaling. Someone may not be disposed
to think, feel, and act as a generous person would think, feel, and act
except insofar as she both thinks of herself as generous (self-concept) and
knows both that others think of her as generous and that they know that
she knows that they think of her as generous (social expectation-
signaling). When this happens, she does not have the trait of generosity
construed in neo-Aristotelian terms, but she does have factitious
generosity.
Factitious generosity thus mirrors several of the more striking struc-
tural features of friendship. You cannot be my friend unless I think of
you as a friend, and you know that I do, and I know that you know that
I do. You cannot be factitiously generous unless I think of you as
generous, and you know that I do, and I know that you know that
I do. You cannot be a friend if you don’t think of yourself as a friend.
You can’t be factitiously generous if you don’t think of yourself as
generous.3 Thus, in addition to the historical and moral psychological
3 Several other contributions to this volume, including those from Jacobs, Sifferd,
Holroyd and Kelly, Webber, Athanassoulis, and Masala, agree that character may be
causally dependent on externalia. The novel contribution of this chapter is to argue that
it may be constitutively dependent.
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motives for taking friendship seriously as a model for the virtues, we also
have an empirical motive for exploring such a model. It may be possible
to satisfy all of these motives by reconstructing other moral virtues on the
model of friendship—as essentially and constitutively social.4
8.3.4 The externalist motive
The final motive for exploring the friendship model of virtue is the
compelling evidence that has begun to pile up for the idea that many
seemingly individual psychological phenomena are better understood as
extending beyond the limits of the skin of the person to whom those
phenomena are ordinarily attributed. In the 1970s, Kripke (1972) and
Putnam (1975) popularized the idea that mental content is external, that
the meaning and reference of some words is not determined solely by
what’s in the heads of people who use those words. In the 1980s, Nozick
(1981) and Dretske (1981) introduced the notion that one’s justification
for a given belief might not be determined solely by what’s in one’s head.
In the 1990s, Clark and Chalmers (1998) suggested that the mind itself
might extend beyond the limits of the skin. According to their parity
principle, if “a part of the world functions as a process which, were it to go
on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the
cognitive process, then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the
cognitive process.” Importantly, they think that external phenomena can
only be recruited in this way if they are reliably available, typically
invoked, automatically endorsed, and easily accessible. I would suggest
that these conditions should be relaxed slightly, such that the external
phenomena be at least as reliable as the relevant internal phenomena, at
least as likely and quickly to be endorsed, and as easily accessible. In a
similar spirit, Adams (2006, 138–43) argues that affiliations, such as
being a Christian or a communist, and social roles, such as being a
(good) father or a (good) teacher, may be plausibly counted as moral
virtues. Sneddon (2011) argues that processes of moral reasoning,
responsibility attribution, moral judgment, and even action production
4 All? Perhaps not humility and modesty, which seem to involve a paradox of self-
reference insofar as it’s hard, though maybe not impossible, to be humble and modest if you
also think of yourself as humble and modest. See Roberts and Wood (2007, ch. 9) for a
discussion of this problem. I explore the possibility of such a paradox of self-reference with
some of my colleagues in Alfano et al. (forthcoming).
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are sometimes not just extended but shared by pairs or even larger
groups of agents. Pritchard (2010) argues that cognitive abilities—
which we might think of as intellectual virtues or parts thereof—may
extend. Likewise, I have argued (Alfano forthcoming a) that the phe-
nomenon of stereotype threat is evidence that cognitive processes extend.
The current proposal is that we should explore the extent to which this
research program can be applied to virtue ethics, that is, the extent to
which it makes sense to say that some or even all psychological disposi-
tions that we might reasonably call moral virtues also extend beyond the
limits of the skin of their possessors. The friendship model is a promising
framework for doing so. At least when we are at our best, we try to live up
to our friends’ expectations; we are attuned to their reactive attitudes; we
consider prospectively whether they would approve or disapprove of
some course of action; we consult with them explicitly, implicitly, and
imaginatively; and we revise our beliefs and values in light of their
feedback. Friendship thus seems to involve the sort of functional inte-
gration that qualifies as an instance of extended character. Millgram
(1987, 368; see also Cocking and Kennett 1998, 504) argues that, over
the course of a friendship, each friend becomes causally, if not constitu-
tively, responsible for the other’s being who she is. Morton (2013) argues,
in the same vein, that sometimes our behavioral dispositions are best
governed by imagining the emotional reactions of those we love and
respect to our thoughts, feelings, and plans.
Thus, we have four independent motivations—historical, moral psy-
chological, empirical, and externalist—for exploring the friendship
model of virtue. None of these is decisive, of course, nor is their con-
junction. Nevertheless, I think that, together, they provide compelling
reasons to give the model a chance. In the balance of this paper, that’s
what I do.
8.4 Trustworthiness on the Friendship Model
To begin fleshing out the friendship model, I want to concentrate on the
virtue I take to be most amenable to assimilation: trustworthiness. Many
philosophers have noticed that friendship often involves trust. Nehamas
(2010, 238), for instance, points out that “friendship is immune, or at
least resistant, to slander: we know our friends well and it takes much to
undermine our faith in their goodness; [friends] trust one another.”
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Likewise, Thomas (1987, 217) claims that one of the three most salient
features of friendship is that “there is an enormous bond of mutual trust
between” friends. Trustworthiness is a good prospect for assimilation to
the friendship model of virtue.
Trustworthiness, as I describe it in this section, has many of the
interesting structural features of friendship. It is not just causally but
constitutively dependent on there being another person who has a
congruent virtue (trustingness). Second, it is not just causally but con-
stitutively dependent on there being another person towards whom you
harbor certain de re attitudes, and who reciprocates with their counter-
parts. Third, it is not just causally but constitutively dependent on your
thinking of yourself as trustworthy. Fourth, it is also not just causally but
constitutively dependent on there being between you and your trustor at
least two orders of mutual knowledge of these attitudes. Finally, trustors
and trustees are connected by characteristic first-, second-, and even
third- and fourth-order emotions, such as the emotion of trust itself, as
well as assurance, betrayal, outrage, repentance, forgiveness, and others.
8.4.1 The cunning mechanism
Consider the example, due to Pettit (1995), of a driver in an unfamiliar
city who relies on a local bus driver to guide him to the city center. He
notices that the bus displays a sign saying ‘Downtown,’ and so feels
comfortable following the bus. However, since he realizes that the bus
driver may find his consistently stopping when the bus stops disturbing,
he pulls up beside the bus at some point to explain what he’s doing. At
this point, he isn’t just passively relying on the bus driver. The bus driver
now knows that he is being relied on, and the car driver knows that the
bus driver knows this. Having put his trust explicitly in the bus driver,
there exist at least two orders of mutual knowledge of this reliance
between them. As Pettit (p. 205) puts it:
The driver knows that I am relying on him and knows that I am aware that he
knows that. Perhaps the reliance even becomes a matter of common knowledge,
with each of us being aware of the reliance, each being aware of this awareness,
each being aware of that higher-order awareness, and so on.
Just as, when we are friends, I wish you well, and you know it, and I know
that you know it, so in such a case of interactive trust, I rely on you, and
you know it, and I know that you know it.
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There is a further point of analogy. When we are friends, I expect our
relationship to count as a reason for action for you. Perhaps you wish me
well for my own sake and in virtue of my good character, but our being
friends provides you an additional reason to wish me well. Just so in the
case of trustworthiness:
I may expect that the driver will be positively moved by seeing that I have made
myself vulnerable and will be motivated all the more strongly to do that which
I am relying on them to do: will be motivated all the more strongly to prove
reliable. (Pettit 1995, 206)
I take it that it is intuitively compelling that the bus driver would or
at least might be thus motivated, but why? Why exactly would the
bus driver sense an additional normative reason to prove reliable just
because he is being explicitly trusted? Pettit’s answer (pp. 214–15) to
this question is that one of the more important rewards in moral
psychology is esteem. People want money, power, sex, and stuff.
They also want to be well regarded—perhaps only instrumentally,
but perhaps also intrinsically. When the car driver explicitly puts his
trust in the bus driver, he manifests a form of a positive regard. This
is, in itself, a reward to the bus driver, assuming that he cares about
how he’s perceived. And, since people are usually loss-averse (Tversky
and Kahneman 1991), any value the bus driver attaches to the car
driver’s newly acquired esteem will tend to be over-valued; he will
attach more negative value to losing this esteem than he attached
positive value to gaining it in the first place. Although Pettit does
not make this further point about loss-aversion, it fits nicely with
his view.
Finally, interactive trust of this kind essentially involves certain emo-
tional dispositions, including higher-order emotional dispositions. At
the first-order level, I will feel gratitude towards the bus driver for
agreeing to lead me to the city center. He may feel anxiety on my behalf
or pride that I chose to trust him rather than someone else. Should he
prove reliable, I will experience another episode of gratitude, which may
induce gratitude in him as well. Should he prove unreliable, I may
experience anger. Should he deliberately lead me astray, I will probably
experience betrayal. In response to the former, he may experience guilt;
to the latter, malicious glee (if he endorses his betrayal) or surprise (if he
didn’t realize that I might react thusly).
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8.4.2 The self-concept mechanism
Along the same lines, we might point out that people also typically find
self-esteem instrumentally and even intrinsically rewarding. When
I signal that I think of you as trustworthy by explicitly putting my trust
in you, I prompt you to revise your self-concept, to accept that you merit
this trust. To the extent that you feel that you do, you will find your
newly revised self-concept rewarding. And, just as loss-aversion makes it
more painful to lose others’ high regard than it is pleasurable to gain it, so
loss-aversion also makes it more painful to give up your own high self-
regard than it is pleasurable to gain it. Hence, to the extent that you find
it difficult to engage in the self-deceptive psychological acrobatics needed
simultaneously to maintain your own self-esteem and to betray my trust,
you will be motivated to prove trustworthy.
In addition, self-concept helps to set defaults for behavior, thought,
and feeling. To the extent that I think of myself as honorable, I will be
more inclined to try to avenge perceived offenses, think of others’ actions
as impinging positively or negatively on my honor, and feel offended or
honored by others’ actions and inactions. My self-concept thus con-
strains what I am inclined to notice, deliberate about, believe, feel, and
do. Just as someone who thinks of herself as X’s friend will perceive,
think, feel, and act in different ways from someone who does not think of
herself as X’s friend, so someone who thinks of himself as patient will
perceive, think, feel, and act in different ways from someone who does
not think of himself as patient. Consider, for example, the following
lyrics from Fountains of Wayne’s song, ‘Michael and Heather’:
Michael and Heather on the shuttle bus
Standing alongside the rest of us
Michael says, “Heather, have you had enough?”
Heather says, “Michael, you know that it’s you I love.”
Does Michael think of himself as Heather’s lover? If he does, he’ll
probably construe her as answering the questions, “Have you had
enough of this airport nonsense?” and responding somewhat playfully,
“None of this nonsense really matters.” But if he thinks of himself as
merely pursuing Heather, it’s likely that he’ll notice a darker reading of
her response. Perhaps she’s not thinking about whether she’s had enough
of waiting at the airport but of their relationship. Perhaps she’s actively
considering whether to break up with him, and is treating his question as
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an invitation to initiate the breakup. What we think of ourselves partially
determines what even occurs to us as a possibility—a possible action, a
possible interpretation, and so on. By influencing each other’s self-
concepts, then, we indirectly influence each other’s conduct.
8.4.3 The hopeful mechanism
There are still further reasons to think that trustworthiness and trust-
ingness can be assimilated to the friendship model. For, as McGeer
points out, Pettit’s explanation of how trust can be self-reinforcing is
not the only possible rationalization of the relevant phenomena. As she
explains, the mechanism Pettit identifies is unstable because it arguably
would not survive its own elevation to mutual or common knowledge:
trustees cannot know or suspect that they are only being trusted because the
trustor is relying on the likelihood of their having a desire for good opinion; for
then trustees will know or suspect that trustors do not really hold them in high
regard (as actually possessing trust-attracting virtues), but only imagine them to
be manipulable because they possess the less admirable trait of seeking others’
good opinions. Hence, trustees will lose the incentive provided by a trustor’s trust
to act in a trust-responsive way. (2008, 252)
If the only reason I have to trust you is that I think that by putting my
trust in you I can induce you to desire the continuance of my (signal of)
high regard and the continuance of your own new-found high self-
regard, then, were you to discover this reason, you might lose the very
motive I aimed to induce. If you realize that my show of trust wasn’t
motivated by high regard but by an assumption about your desire for
high regard, you may cease to value my show of trust. This does not
mean that the mechanism Pettit identifies is never active, but it does
suggest that there may be other, more stable mechanisms that produce
similar results.
One is the mechanism of self-esteem and loss-aversion, which
I sketched earlier. To my knowledge, it has not been identified previously.
Even if you were to discover that my expression of trust was an attempt at
manipulation, if you had at that point already revised your self-concept,
you would still presumably find itmore aversive to go back to your old self-
concept than you found it rewarding to revise in the first place.
Another mechanism, identified by McGeer, involves the attitude
of hope. For her, hope essentially involves trusting beyond what the
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available evidence supports.5 McGeer reminds her readers that human
motivation is often complicated and confusing. Sometimes we don’t
know what we really desire, like, or love. Sometimes, we forget what we
really value. In those cases, it’s often helpful to refer to a normative
lodestone, a model of conduct. She goes on:
For help in this regard, we are sometimes encouraged to look outside ourselves
for role models, finding in others’ thoughts and actions laudable patterns on
which to fashion our own. And this may serve us pretty well. However, some-
thing similar can occur, often more effectively, through the dynamic of hopeful
scaffolding. Here we look outside ourselves once again; but instead of looking for
laudable patterns in others’ behaviour, what we find instead are laudable patterns
that others see—or prospectively see—in our own. We see ourselves as we might
be, and thereby become something like a role model for ourselves. The advantage
in this is clear: Instead of thinking, ‘I want to be like her,’—i.e., like someone else
altogether—the galvanizing thought that drives us forward is seemingly more
immediate and reachable: ‘I want to be as she already sees me to be.’ (2008,
248–9)
This seems like a plausible explanation of at least some trustworthiness
induced by acts of trust. It also fits nicely with existing discussions of
friendship, according to which friendship is an especially salubrious
context for acquiring self-knowledge. This illuminates the Aristotelian
dictum that a friend is another self (see also Cooper 1977a, 300). It can
sometimes be easier to know and understand oneself through the reflect-
ive mirror of what a friend sees in you than through introspection. And,
if the extended character thesis is on the right track, there might be no
fact of the matter concerning what your character is like until it is
reflected back to you in the eyes of another person. Your trustworthiness
might essentially involve your knowing that another person trusts you,
or even that another person trusts you in a spirit of hope. The friendship
model seems to satisfy all of the criteria that Clark and Chalmers
(1998) identify as necessary for extended cognition: reliability, typica-
lity, endorsement, and accessibility. Cues of trust tend to be reliably
available—certainly as reliably available as other incitements to trust-
worthiness. Whether someone trusts someone else is typically invoked in
predicting, explaining, and evaluating behavior. When someone with
5 Hope thus clashes, prima facie, with epistemic rationality. Stroud (2006) likewise
argues that friendship clashes, prima facie, with epistemic rationality—another point of
analogy.
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whom I have an ongoing relationship of trust expects me to do some-
thing, feel a certain way, or think something, I generally endorse this
expectation automatically. Finally, the expectations and sentiments of
my trustors tend to be easily accessible to me. I generally know what they
want me to do.
Between McGeer’s hope-based mechanism and my own self-concept-
based mechanism, we may account for much of the factitious trust-
worthiness that Pettit’s model doesn’t cover. Trustworthiness and
trustingness might then be said to constitute an interrelated and non-
reducible dyad in much the same way that your being my friend and my
being your friend constitute an interrelated and non-reducible dyad.
Your being trustworthy would depend not just causally but constitutively
(if only in part) on my trustingness, and my trustingness would depend
not just causally but constitutively (if only in part) on your trustworthi-
ness. Your trustworthiness would depend not just causally but constitu-
tively on my harboring certain de re attitudes (of reliance, trust, and
hope) towards you, and on your reciprocating with their counterparts
(reliability, assurance, etc.). Your trustworthiness would depend not just
causally but constitutively on your thinking of yourself as trustworthy
(and hence, through loss-aversion, being unwilling to betray my trust).
Your trustworthiness would depend not just causally but constitutively
on there being between us at least two orders of mutual knowledge of
these attitudes. Finally, your and my sentiments in a trusting relationship
tend to be highly attuned, to the point that they will easily generate
characteristic first-, second-, and even third- and fourth-order emotions
in appropriate conditions.
8.5 Conclusion
In this section, I briefly summarize the argument thus far, then offer a
few remarks about my naturalistic methodology.
8.5.1 Summary of the argument thus far
I’ve now argued both that we have reasons to take the friendship model
seriously and that there are understandable naturalistic mechanisms
through which it could work. If the considerations explored in section
8.2 are on the right track, then we have four main reasons to explore the
friendship model. First, doing so reconnects virtue theory with its
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historical roots. Second, doing so helps explain why friendship, like other
virtues, is a thick concept. Third, doing so may help to overcome or
sidestep the situationist challenge. Finally, doing so may help to establish
useful connections with externalist discussions in philosophy of mind.
Naturally, all of these connections may also work in the other direction,
helping virtue theorists export their insights and arguments to ancient
philosophy, moral psychology, empirically informed ethics, and exter-
nalist philosophy of mind.
Furthermore, if the explanations explored in section 8.4 are on the
right track, there are at least three mechanisms that, together, help
explain how trustworthiness and trustingness are interdependent as the
friendship model suggests. When the cunning mechanism is activated,
one person’s trustworthiness depends on another person’s trustingness
because the trustworthy person is motivated to prove himself worthy of
the trust and esteem that have been directed his way. In this case, he
wants to prove to the person who trusted him that he was and is worthy.6
When the self-concept mechanism is activated, once again, one person’s
trustworthiness depends on another person’s trustingness because the
trustworthy person is motivated to prove himself worthy of the trust and
esteem that have been directed his way. In this instance, though, he
wants to prove to himself that he is worthy, in order to hold onto his
positive self-concept.7 Either way, esteem drives him forward. When the
hopeful mechanism is activated, one person’s trustworthiness depends
on another person’s trustingness because that trustingness gives him self-
knowledge, opens up some actions as genuine possibilities, forecloses
other actions as beyond the pale, and instills him with vicarious confi-
dence. These are exactly the sorts of mechanisms that characterize
friendship and that make it a paramount moral good.
8.5.2 Methodological remark
In this paper, I’ve described a model of trusting relationships. Is this
model descriptive or normative? Does it characterize how trust actually,
typically (or at least often) works, or does it characterize how trust ought
to work? This question is prompted by the more general concern
whether, in philosophical psychology, we should aim to elaborate
6 For more on this, see Wong (2006), especially ch. 4.
7 For more on this, see Appiah (2011).
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descriptive or normative models. It might seem that I’ve given up on
normativity altogether. One might be tempted to object, with Browning’s
Andrea del Sarto, that “a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, / Or
what’s a heaven for?”
In response, I want to argue that ethics, like political philosophy,
would benefit from a distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory
(Rawls 1999). Moreover, I want to argue that we neglect non-ideal ethical
theory at our own peril. One potentially fruitful way to proceed in virtue
theory is to describe in rich detail how things actually, typically (or at
least often) work, then use that description as an anchor for describing
how they might work better. The ideal theorist wants to describe how
things could be optimally. But there are reasons to prefer baby steps.
First, because ethics is a practical domain, ethical theory (including
virtue theory) should at least sometimes be a useful guide to action. If





250 13ʺ East, I haven’t given you an optimal answer. Similarly, if
you ask me the way to Larissa and I tell you to go that way for an hour
and then ask someone else, I haven’t given you an optimal answer. But
both answers are useful, and they’re especially useful in tandem. Suppose
for the sake of argument that the neo-Aristotelian picture of virtue is an
adequate ideal theory. That doesn’t mean that it’s the only thing we need
to know. Suppose for the sake of argument my friendship model of virtue
suggests a few steps one could take towards being more virtuous. That
doesn’t mean it’s the only thing we need to know.
Second, ethics—especially virtue ethics—might best be construed as
essentially developmental. The point of virtue is not to achieve it and
then rest content in your achievement. The point of virtue is to take
another step away from where you started and another step towards a
better way of living.
Third, as Morton (2012) convincingly argues in the context of intel-
lectual rather than moral virtues, perfection can be the enemy of the
good. Suppose that it would be better to achieve normative ideal X than
to achieve normative ideal Y. But suppose that one’s reach often does
exceed one’s grasp—that striving for X typically or even always yields at
best an approximation of X, and that striving for Y typically or even
always yields at best an approximation of Y. The following argument is
clearly invalid: If X is better than Y, then an approximation of X is better
than an approximation of Y. Now suppose, as I suspect many orthodox
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virtue theorists would say, that intrinsic trustworthiness is superior to
factitious trustworthiness. In other words, suppose that trustworthiness
whose vehicle is the trustworthy agent is morally superior to trustworthi-
ness whose vehicle is that agent along with someone else who trusts her.
It doesn’t follow that an approximation of intrinsic trustworthiness is
superior to an approximation of factitious trustworthiness. That depends
on how well we approximate them. The jury is still out on that question.
The right attitude to take, then, is not dismissiveness but curiosity.8
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